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JUSTICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Thomas M. Franck*
Steven W. Hawkins**
I. INTRODUCTION
"Justice," Rawls claims in A Theory of Justice,' "is the first virtue
of social institutions .... "2 The principles of justice of which Rawls
speaks, however, except for a brief excursion, "apply only within the
borders of a nation-state."' 3 Our purpose is to see whether justice is
also the first virtue of the international system, the social institutions
of the community of nations. More specifically, is justice the definitive
virtue by which to judge international law? This article seeks to an-
swer those questions by examining the concept of justice as developed
by various theorists, culminating in the contemporary Rawlsian the-
ory of justice. It then examines whether the international application
of the Rawlsian concept of justice can serve as a useful guide to those
participating in the building of an international system with the help
of laws and law-making institutions. To this end, we test the Rawlsian
concept of justice in three existential situations where popular claims
of justice appear to be in conflict, to see whether the Rawlsian concept
is capable of providing a definitive answer to the problem of indetermi-
nacy. Finally, this article explores the relationship between justice and
a related concept, legitimacy, in the international system.
Why bother with justice? What is the payoff? Msgr. Ronald
Knox, when asked by a student: "Why study ancient Greek?" is said
to have replied: "Aside from the fact that Greek happens to be the
native language of the Holy Ghost, it is a requisite for social advance-
ment at the universities." One might venture a paraphrase: "Aside
from the fact that justice is the historic global aspiration of all human-
ity, it is the enduring intellectual preoccupation of those at the univer-
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1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Griffin, Reconstructing Rawls's Theory of Justice: Developing a Public Values Philosophy of
the Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 715, 719-20 (1987).
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sities with any jurisprudential inclination." There are also
considerations that are more utilitarian. The international community
makes its rules primarily by bargaining. In the negotiations leading up
to an international treaty, it is tactically useful to be able to argue a
case based not only on self-interest but on the coincidence (or an ac-
commodation) between self-interest and justice. To do that, a negotia-
tor must have a theory of justice which transcends national interest
and is universally cognizable. Thus, the pursuit of such a theory is not
a purely intellectual-philosophical conceit.
Moreover, the ability of a treaty to obligate, even one which has
been signed and ratified by most states, will depend in part on whether
it appears to operate in accordance with generally recognized princi-
ples of justice. This is not identical to whether the treaty embodied
just principles when it was drafted. The utilitarian considerations,
however, are similar. It will be easier to persuade a state or states to
obey the treaty if it is seen to be just "on its face" and if it appears to
be operating justly: that is, in accordance with a generally accepted
notion of what justice is. Conversely, the costs in community disap-
probation incurred by a state which fails to comply with a treaty com-
mitment will vary in proportion to the general perception of the
textual and existential justice or injustice of the obligation. Thus there
are practical as well as philosophical reasons to concern oneself with
the notion of justice in the international community.
These reasons are not refuted by the vulgarization of the concept in
the superficial propagandistic rhetoric of statecraft. It is strategically
beneficial, not merely morally satisfying, for a state to be able to argue
convincingly to the governments of the world that it is acting justly, or
against injustice. However, the operative word, here, is "convinc-
ingly." This means that the justice claim must resonate in the hearts
and minds of the governing elites and attentive publics of the nations
of the world, at a minimum. To be at all effective, the justice claim
must be framed in globally cognizable terms. This is not easy, but it
happens to correspond quite closely to Rawls's notion of what it takes
to arrive at a principle of justice.
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF RAWLS'S THEORY
Rawls's theory of justice is based upon a negotiating metaphor in
which the persons (representing themselves, or, in one scenario, na-
tions) come together to work out rules for survival, commerce and
other aspects of social accommodation and progress. The metaphor, it
is apparent, is closely related to others used to explain the consensual
or congruent basis of certain kinds of socio-political association. No-
[Vol. 10:127
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tably, it is kin to the idea of a social contract as the basis of govern-
ance, and it is there that the study of the Rawlsian concept of justice
must begin.
In order to understand the elaboration of social contract theory
proposed by Rawls in A Theory of Justice, it is necessary to examine
the historical foundation upon which he builds. Beginning with Hob-
bes's seminal study, Leviathan,4 social contract doctrine has been re-
fined by Locke's The Second Treatise of Civil Government,5 Rousseau's
On The Social Contract,6 and Kant's ethical works, notably The Foun-
dations of the Metaphysics of Morals.7 Rawls regards the work of
Locke, Rousseau and Kant as definitive of the social contract tradi-
tion,8 and so we begin our analysis with them.
III. THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ON THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
Locke, like Hobbes, maintains that we are by our nature free, equal
and independent beings. 9 Consequently, we can only be deprived of
our estates and of our liberty, and subjected to the political control of
another, if, and to the extent that, we agree to empower such author-
ity. We do this, as Locke states, "by agreeing.., to join and unite into
a community for [our] comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of [our] properties and a
greater security against any that are not of it." °
The community formed by the consent of each individual acts as
one body under the will and determination of the majority.t' Each
person, in consenting to form a united body politic under one govern-
ment, is obligated to submit to the "determination of the majority, and
4. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651), reprinted in 3 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HoB-
BES OF MALMESBURY (W. Molesworth ed. 1839).
5. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (W. Carpenter ed. 1955) (1690).
6. J. ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (D. Cress trans. ed. 1983) (1762).
7. I. KANT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (T. Abbott trans. 1873)
(1785), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL KANT 295-360 (A. Zweig ed. 1970).
8. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 11 n.4.
9. Locke describes our natural condition - i.e., our status as free and equal beings - as the
state of nature. It is a state of perfect freedom, whereby we order our actions and dispose of our
possessions as we see fit. It is a state of equality, "wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal" and creatures of the same species are "equal one amongst another without subordina-
tion or subjection." See J. LOCKE, supra note 5, at 118. The state of nature is only bound by the
laws of nature, which proscribe each person from divesting another of the inalienable rights to
life, liberty and property. Id. at 119-20.
10. Id. at 164.
11. Id. at 165.
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to be concluded by it." Were it otherwise, the original social compact
would be meaningless, and we would "be left free and under no other
ties than [those existing] before in the state of Nature."12 Moreover,
where the majority cannot make a determination or draw a conclu-
sion, it cannot act as one body, and therefore dissolves.1 3
Writing nearly a century later, Rousseau observed that the social
compact is "a form of association which defends and protects with all
common forces the person and goods of each associate...." Properly
understood, the compact for "the total alienation of each associate,
together with all of his rights, to the entire community."' 4 However,
this arrangement does not depreciate an associate's person and prop-
erty, but rather appreciates them. Associates in the social union,'5 by
giving themselves and their belongings to the community, actually
give all this back to themselves, in somewhat altered form. What they
acquire back are precisely the same rights that they yield to others.
They thereby gain an equivalent for everything that they lose. In addi-
tion, they gain an augmented collective force for the preservation of
what they now have.16
Although associates in a political community relinquish their natu-
ral liberty and right to adversary possession, they gain civil liberty and
the proprietorship of all they possess. In weighing one against the
other, Rousseau distinguishes natural liberty, "which is limited solely
by the force of the individual," from civil liberty, "which is limited by
the general will" and possession, "which is merely the effect of force or
the right of the first occupant," from proprietary ownership, "which is
based solely on positive title."' 7
Moreover, the social contract creates obligations. Associates have
obligations both to themselves and to every member of the union.
These obligations civilize and socialize the members. As they move
"from the state of nature to the civil state ... duty replaces physical
impulse .. ."18 Notions of justice replace instinct as guides to their
conduct, thereby giving their actions the morality that had been want-
ing. "[They are] forced to act upon other principles and to consult
[their] reason before listening to [their] inclinations."' 9 This alone,
12. Id.
13. Id. at 166.
14. J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 6, at 24.
15. Rousseau states that in our corporate capacity "we receive each member as an indivisible
part of the whole." Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 27.
18. Id. at 26.
19. Id. at 27.
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Rousseau maintains, makes an associate "truly the master of himself.
For to be driven by appetite alone is slavery, and obedience to the law
which one has prescribed for oneself is liberty."'20
Kant seeks to further our understanding of parties to the social
compact by explaining their actions in terms of the "categorical imper-
ative."' 21 In other words, they act on the basis of general principles
which are intuitively recognized and not self-contradictory. Examples
include the keeping of promises or the telling of truth. It implies that
each individual "act according to that maxim which you can at the
same time will to be a universal law."' 22 The categorical imperative
therefore enables the freedom of each person's will to exist together
with the freedom of others according to mutually recognized
principles.
Kant also places great emphasis, as did his contemporary, Rous-
seau, on human dignity. For him, rational beings exist as ends in
themselves, and not merely as the means to an end.23 The systematic
union of individuals by common objective laws is called a "kingdom of
ends" because these laws have in view the relation of these beings to
one another as ends. 24 In this realm "everything has either value or
dignity. Whatever has a value can be replaced by . . . [its]
equivalent."' 25 Because persons are ends, and may not be used merely
as means, they are above all price, and have no equivalent. They
therefore possess dignity.
Morality, autonomy of will, and human dignity mold Kant's polit-
ical theory, which focuses on the concept of right,26 equality before the
law, 2 7 and the need for an educational process that increases enlight-
enment. 28 On the international level, Kant argues for a system of
world peace and for world citizenship. 29 Optimistically, he believes
that the guarantee of perpetual peace was given by nature, which
20. Id.
21. For an explication of the categorical imperative, see I. KANT, supra note 7, at 317-24.
22. Id. at 324.
23. Id. at 329-30.
24. For a discussion of this concept, see id. at 334-35.
25. Id. at 335.
26. See generally I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie trans. ed. 1887) (2d ed.
1798).
27. Kant viewed equality before the law as an a priori principle of a civil state. See part II of
Kant's essay On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in
Practice, in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 74-77 (H. Nisbet trans., H. Reiss ed. 1970).
28. See § 3, ch. 10 of Kant's The Contest of Faculties (1798), reprinted in id. at 188-89.
29. See I. KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (N. Butler trans. 1939) (2d ed. 1796).
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shows a design to make harmony spring from human discord. 30
IV. RAWLS'S THEORY OF JUSTICE
Rawls has built a theory of justice on these contractarian notions
of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, adapting the idea of the social compact
to formulate principles of justice by which to measure its presence or
absence in the basic structure of any society. While Rawls does not
seek to advance any particular form of government, his theory is in-
tended to facilitate fairness and justice in the rules and institutions of
any social system. Thus, he defines justice not in terms of a particular
kind of association capable of producing a designated social good, but
as one based on a rule of procedure, of decision. Rawls's principles of
justice are whatever "free and rational persons concerned to further
their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as
defining the fundamental terms of their association."' 31 The process by
which principles of justice are defined is of crucial importance. What
the principles produce in the way of "goods" is not irrelevant, but of
secondary importance.
Crucial to this process-oriented concept of justice is the notion of
an initial situation of equality. Rawls refers to it as the "original posi-
tion," a purely metaphoric allusion in the tradition of social con-
tractarianism. In this original position, parties to the social compact
are unaware of their social or class status. They choose principles of
justice behind a veil of ignorance, by which is meant that they would
make their choice lacking specific knowledge of who they are in the
real world: that is, in ignorance of their relative strengths, vulnerabili-
ties and weaknesses. As noted by Rawls:
This [the veil of ignorance] assures that no one is advantaged or disad-
vantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or
the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated
and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition,
the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. 32
The veil of ignorance is the essential element of the original posi-
tion since it implements the element of fairness that is essential to
Rawls's theory. But there are three other essential components of the
original position which also need to be understood before seeking to
apply Rawlsian notions of justice to the international system: the cir-
30. See first supplement (On the Guarantee of a Perpetual Peace) of Kant's PERPETUAL
PEACE, KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 27, at 108-09.
31. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 11.
32. Id. at 12.
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cumstances of justice, formal constraints on the concept of right, and
rationality of the parties. We shall describe each in brief.
V. CIRCUMSTANCES OF JUSTICE, FORMAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE
CONCEPT OF RIGHT, AND RATIONALITY
Circumstances of Justice33 refers to the background conditions
which make social cooperation necessary in the original position.
From an objective standpoint, there must exist a condition of moder-
ate scarcity. By this Rawls means that parties must be in a situation of
mutual co-existence with numerous claims to limited resources. In a
Garden of Eden, the notion of justice would be irrelevant and the need
to develop its principles behind a veil of ignorance would be a non
sequitur. Subjectively, parties must possess their own life plans, which
Rawls refers to as conceptions of the good, and these conceptions must
consequently come into continuous conflict, each person being primar-
ily interested in promoting his or her own well-being. Only in these
circumstances is a notion of distributional justice relevant. As Rawls
points out, "circumstances of justice obtain whenever ... persons put
forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under
conditions of moderate scarcity." '34
Formal constraints of the concept of right 35 are procedural limita-
tions which Rawls believes must operate in the original position if
principles of justice are to be negotiated successfully. The first con-
straint is that all principles of justice agreed upon must be general in
form: "it must be possible to formulate them without the use of what
would be intuitively recognized as proper names, or rigged definite de-
scriptions. ' ' 36 Second, they must be universal, holding for everyone by
virtue of their being moral persons. 37 Third, there must be publicity.
Everyone in the community must be able to know what principles
have been accepted. Fourth, there must be a process by which con-
flicting claims arising in respect of the application of an agreed general
principle can be ordered through a process independent of such factors
as the parties' social position, or intimidation and coercion. Fifth, the
system of principles established in the initial position must be final in
that "[t]here are no higher standards to which arguments in support of
33. See id. § 22, at 126-130.
34. Id. at 128.
35. See id. § 23, at 130-36.
36. Id. at 131.
37. Rawls explains that generality and universality are distinct. For example, if everyone has
to serve the interests of a dictator, there exists the latter but not the former. See id. at 132.
Winter 19891
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claims can be addressed." '38 In sum, Rawls states, "a conception of
right is a set of principles, general in form and universal in application,
that is to be publicly recognized as a final court of appeal for ordering
the conflicting claims of moral persons."'39
Rationality of the parties4° is assumed in discussion of the original
position. As explained by Rawls, "[a] rational person is thought to
have a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him.
He ranks these options according to how well they further his pur-
poses; he follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather
than less, and which has the greater chance of being successfully exe-
cuted."' 4' Consequently, the principles of justice are derived through a
process that seeks to maximize the self-interest of each participant in
the social compact, given their limited information about the commu-
nity and their role in it. In other words, the parties are deemed to
have in their heads a map of the sort of society to which they want to
belong even though they do not know what their role in it will be.
They are assumed to intend to pursue the building of such a society in
a rational manner by negotiating applicable general principles to gov-
ern that society's operations. Stated another way, "persons in the
original position try to acknowledge principles which advance their
system of ends as far as possible. They do this by attempting to win
for themselves the highest index of primary social goods, since this
enables them to promote their conception of the good most effectively
whatever it turns out to be."'42
VI. LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE PREEMINENT PRINCIPLES
Having outlined the characteristics of the Rawlsian original posi-
tion, the stage is set to approach his principles of justice. We know
that parties will negotiate the social compact behind a veil of igno-
rance, which guarantees that they will choose neutral principles be-
cause they lack biasing knowledge of their role, circumstances, talents
and infirmities in "real" life. We also know that they will bargain in
socio-economic conditions of moderate scarcity and that the parties
will have conflicting claims to limited resources that will reflect their
various conceptions of the social good.
What choices will such negotiators make? Where will their prefer-
ences overlap to form general principles? Rawls believes that under
38. Id. at 135.
39. Id.
40. See id. § 25, at 142-50.
41. Id. at 143.
42. Id. at 144.
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the posited conditions, parties acting rationally and in compliance
with the formal constraints of the concept of right will agree on two
principles for ordering the basic institutional structure of society. The
first, The Principle of Liberty, would state that "Each person is to have
an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for others."' 43 The second, The Principle of Equality,
would state that "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged
so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity."44
Moreover, these two principles would emerge in "lexical order."
Rawls explains that "[t]his is an order which requires us to satisfy the
first principle in the ordering before we can move to the second....
[T]he basic structure of society is to arrange the inequalities of wealth
and authority in ways consistent with the equal liberties required by
the preceding principle." 45
VII. THE RAWLSIAN THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
Rawls's concepts have been addressed, essentially, to justice in na-
tional community, to what he refers to as "a special case of the prob-
lem of justice."'46 By this he means that his notions of how principles
of justice are negotiated behind the veil of ignorance assumes that the
negotiators are drawing up rules "for the basic structure of [a] society
conceived . . . as a closed system isolated from other societies."
47
Thus, his principles are not necessarily applicable to a multinational
gathering of negotiators, and Rawls admits that "the law of nations
may require different principles arrived at in a somewhat different
way."148 Nevertheless, after describing the principles for domestic jus-
tice (the basic institutional structure for any society), 49 Rawls does
briefly consider the problem of justice in the international arena.50
43. Id. at 60.
44. Id. at 83.
45. Id. at 43.
46. Id. at 7.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id.
49. Parties only reach the question of international justice after having first dealt with the
basic structure of social institutions and, secondly, with natural duties, obligations and permis-
sions of individuals. The order of progression is supposed to create a coherent set of principles
for justice as fairness. And, presumably, by the time the issue of the law of nations is reached,
conceptions of international justice are sufficiently circumscribed by the constraints of institu-
tional and individual justice. See schematic diagram and discussion, id. at 108-11.
50. See id. § 58, at 377-82. Rawls considers the situation of a conscientious objector to a war
Winter 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
He begins by reinterpreting his concept of the original position as
follows:
[O]ne may extend the interpretation of the original position and think of
the parties as representatives of different nations who must choose to-
gether the fundamental principles to adjudicate conflicting claims among
states. Following out the conception of the initial situation, I assume
that these representatives are deprived of various kinds of information.
While they know that they represent different nations each living under
the normal circumstances of human life, they know nothing about the
particular circumstances of their own society .... Once again the con-
tracting parties, in this case representatives of states, are allowed only
enough knowledge to make a rational choice to protect their interests but
not so much that the more fortunate among them can take advantage of
their special situation. This original position is fair between nations; it
nullifies the contingencies and biases of historical fate. Justice between
states is determined by the principles that would be chosen in the origi-
nal position so interpreted.51
Rawls does not argue for any specific international principles, but, in-
stead, presumes that states would agree to principles that are already
familiar to us. Citing Professor Brierly, he does suggest what some of
these are likely to be. The first might be that states are endowed with
certain fundamental equal rights, ones which are analogous to the
equal rights of citizens under a constitutional government. Starting
here, Rawls finds it possible to deduce some other principles to which
states would agree in the original position, including those that ap-
proximate "liberty." Thus, in addition to the notion of equality, states
might agree to the principles of nonintervention and self-
determination.5 2
We will use these hypothetical principles to test the applicability of
Rawls's notion of justice to the international community. To do so, it
is not necessary to agree that they are the principles on which agree-
ment would actually be reached by states' representatives negotiating
behind a global veil of ignorance in accordance with the applicable
Rawlsian strictures described in section 5, above. It is our purpose
merely to examine whether any general principles of justice arrived at
in the prescribed manner could serve as a reliable yardstick with
which to measure actual normative distance in the real world: that is,
he considers in violation of international law. This leads him to regard the moral basis of the law
of nations.
51. Id. at 378.
52. Rawls relies upon J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS chs. IV-V (6th ed. 1963) in
stating these basic principles. See id. at 378 n.27. In addition to nonintervention and self-deter-
mination, Rawls also notes the right of collective self-defense, the sanctity of treaties and princi-
ples applicable to jus in bello. Id. at 378-79.
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to judge the justice of actual state conduct and of specific international
agreements.
The ensuing sections of this essay will attempt such an application
of hypothetical principles of justice. It is assumed that 1) certain prin-
ciples have been agreed by the representatives of states; 2) that in par-
ticular existential situations or crises, the meaning and application of
those principles is put in question; and 3) that the outcome of resolu-
tion of the existential situation will, in part, depend upon whether a
specific, convincing just solution can be derived from a general princi-
ple. In other words, are general principles of justice able to offer gui-
dance to just action in particular situational conflicts? It should again
be recalled that, even if the answer to this question is in the affirma-
tive, this would only demonstrate that principle as justice could be a
factor relevant to the resolution of actual problems in the life of the
community of states. It does not demonstrate that nations would
choose to act justly. As we noted in the introduction, however, justice
has politico-social "clout" as leverage in negotiating solutions to con-
tested problems, quite aside from its intrinsic philosophical merit as
evidence of the grace of states.
VIII. NONINTERVENTION
Suppose control of the sovereign state of Malarkey with a popula-
tion of 7 million had been seized from a democratic but corrupt gov-
ernment by an army coup headed by a paranoid colonel who had
instituted a reign of terror against the middle class, professionals, civil
servants and anyone with more than an elementary education. In the
first twelve months, a million civilians had been executed summarily,
half a million were arbitrarily imprisoned or had disappeared. The
economy was destroyed and two million starving refugees had relo-
cated in neighboring states. The foreign ministers of these neighbors
have gathered to discuss the situation. There is talk of collective inter-
vention in Malarkey. Would Rawlsian general principles of justice be
relevant to such a conference? If considerations of justice are assumed
to play a role in the outcome of these states' deliberations, what would
be the applicable principles of justice? Is it possible to state relevant
principles of justice that would be convincing to the world's govern-
ments and attentive publics?
As noted in the previous section, Rawls has addressed this problem
briefly. Using his veil of ignorance metaphor, he has pictured repre-
sentatives of states, unaware of which states they represent, arriving at
a general principle of nonintervention. In his conception of the inter-
national original position, Rawls postulates a world of separate and
Winter 1989]
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equal states, sovereign and autonomous entities, analogous to persons
as Kantian ends in themselves. 53 As representatives of these societies,
parties to the negotiations behind the veil of ignorance naturally would
be guided by considerations of equality between "independent peoples
organized as states," 54 since that is what the negotiators represent, and
they are ignorant of whether "their" states are powerful or weak,
threatened or threatening. Acting in rational self-interest they would
therefore concur in a principle of nonintervention: the sovereign right
of each state to settle its own internal affairs without external pressure.
This general principle, however, happens to be identical to the
Hobbesian understanding of the state of nature, which should give
pause to anyone seeking to define principles of justice. For Hobbes,
the state of nature is a state of equality among people. There is no
political authority towering over them. Each person acts only for au-
tonomous, selfish reasons. In those circumstances, Hobbes said, no
moral principles can govern. The absence of a government to reward
compliance or punish noncompliance with a moral code means that
persons would not obey one. There would be no rational basis for
yielding autonomy because no one would believe that, in the absence
of a leviathan capable of enforcing normative obligations, compliance
by one would be reciprocated by the many. 5
Hobbes postulates international relations which correspond with
this state of nature. Thus, among states there can be no guiding moral
principles. All "kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of
their independence, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and
posture of gladiators [the state of war] .... -56 Moral constraints are
unfettered because "in states, and commonwealths not dependent on
one another, every commonwealth ... has an absolute liberty, to do
what it shall judge ... most conducing to [its] benefit."' 57 Professor
Charles Beitz characterizes this as "international moral skepticism. 58
Professor Antonio Cassese has recently demonstrated that the moral
climate in Hobbes's time was not so different from ours. He argues
53. Rawls here follows the thoughts of early theorists like Wolff, who wrote in 1749 that
"[n]ations are regarded as individual free persons living in a state of nature." 2 C. WOLFF, Jus
GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM 9 (J. Drake trans. 1934). Upon this view,
"states might be conceived as moral beings which are organic wholes with the capacity to realize
their nature in the choice and pursuit of ends." C. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 76 (1979) (footnote omitted).
54. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 378.
55. T. HOBBES, supra note 4, at 116-17.
56. Id. at 115.
57. Id. at 201.
58. For Beitz's analysis of moral skepticism in the international state of nature see C. BEITZ,
supra note 53, at 27-34.
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that the principle of nonintervention has become more, rather than
less, dominant in the thinking of states in the post-colonial era domi-
nated - at least numerically - by new nations jealously guarding
their hard-won sovereign prerogatives.59
While that may be the condition of contemporary realpolitik, it
tells us nothing about principles of justice applicable to Malarkey. It
would be odd, indeed, if Rawlsian justice and this persistent interna-
tional state of nature were to coincide, since the former is an idealized
construct and the latter a mere mirroring of current political realities.
Such coincidence warns us that something must be wrong with a pro-
cess which necessarily leads to the conclusion that the requisites of
justice are satisfied by a Hobbesian notion of the prevalent sovereign
atomism of states.
According to such an account of justice, a state would never be
justified in intervening in the internal affairs of any other. The agree-
ment reached behind the veil of ignorance would require states to
leave Malarkey alone to sort out its own problems, no matter how
egregious. Applying such a concept of justice to recent real-life events,
India must be judged to have acted unjustly in intervening to end
Pakistani oppression in what is now Bangladesh and Vietnam would
have acted unjustly by intervening in Cambodia to stop the Khmer
Rouge's reign of genocidal terror. Justice would have been served
when the world left Field Marshal Idi Amin free to decimate the pop-
ulation of Uganda.
This seems an odd result for a theory of justice. It becomes odder
still when one contrasts it with Rawls's conjecture that, behind the veil
of ignorance, states' representatives would endorse the right of each
nation to be defended by other states against external threat to its citi-
zens' liberties. 6° Justice, he posits, sustains the use of force by one
state in defense of the liberties of another. Can justice then fail to
authorize the use of force by states against a regime which ravages its
own people? Such a paradox may well be shrewd assessment of con-
temporary political realities, but surely falls short of any principled
account of the requisites of justice.
Intuitively, we know these to be untenable results, for we are led to
something more like Hobbes's state of nature than Rawls's community
of just principles. While such results may stir doubts about the appli-
cability of Rawls's concepts to a search for international justice, the
defect lies not in the model but in its incorrect application. So, back to
59. A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 144-46 (1986).
60. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 380.
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the drawing board we go. In the negotiations between representatives
of states in the original position behind the veil of ignorance are 159
foreign ministers, who know that they represent states, but have no
idea whether those states are rich or poor; white, brown, yellow or
black; democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian. They do know, how-
ever, that in the real world each of these circumstances and conditions
exist. Would they agree upon a rule of nonintervention that precludes
collective action against Malarkey? Probably not.
While the representatives undoubtedly would agree on a general
principle of nonintervention (since they could imagine themselves as
the weak, poor, perhaps even democratic victims of strong, rich, per-
haps totalitarian interventionist forces), rational self-interest would
also cause them to agree on certain exceptions. Chief among these
would be conditions similar to those existing in Malarkey. There is
absolutely no reason to believe that any foreign minister, negotiating
behind the veil of ignorance, would wish to promote a principle pro-
tecting the mad excesses of the Malarkian colonel. On the contrary, it
would be rational for each negotiator to assume: 1) that it would be
very unlikely that his or her nation would need to be rescued from a
murderous dictator, since the prerequisite conditions occur but rarely
in such aggravated form as in Malarkey, and 2) that he or she would
welcome external rescue, were the worst to happen. Foreign minis-
ters, after all, tend to be among the first victims after a seizure of
power by such regimes as that of Malarkey. Thus rational negotiators
seeking to define a principle of justice would opt for a Malarkian ex-
ception to the general norm of nonintervention.
Rawls, in his brief attempt to apply his theory to international af-
fairs, did not make such a refinement. Real nations, in the real world
of multilateral diplomacy, also have failed to do so, despite this de-
monstrable degree of correlation between the demands of political self-
interest and of justice. This cannot be mere perversity. It is instruc-
tive to examine why nations still prefer a Hobbesian rule of noninter-
vention despite its evident injustice, an injustice easily comprehended
intuitively.
That they have done so is readily apparent. When it comes to mili-
tary intervention, the United Nations usually has opted not to differ-
entiate between just and unjust social arrangements, but instead favors
treating all states, probably even such as Malarkey, as autonomous
entities entitled to be left alone. In the public pose, nations pretend to
believe, with Hobbes, that in the world "nothing can be unjust. The
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notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have no place."'6 ' Ar-
ticle 2(4) of the U.N. Charter62 proscribes the "threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence" of any na-
tion, whether Malarkey or Switzerland. And nothing in the Charter is
regarded as authorizing the international community "to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state" (Article 2(7)). Moreover, much of the U.N. Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-Operation Among States 63 is devoted to enunciating principles of
nonintervention and sovereign equality of states. The sole exception,
in texts and in practice, is a tolerance for, and encouragement of, ex-
ternal support for insurgent forces fighting residual colonialism, for-
eign occupation (the West Bank) and South Africa's brand of
racism.64
The practice of the U.N. in applying these principles of noninter-
vention may well confirm the continued prevalence of Hobbesian
moral skepticism among states. But that does not transform a reper-
toire of practice into a general principle of justice. Despite ample, vali-
dated reports of genocide in Kampuchea, the Organization largely
ignored that atrocity, 65 choosing, instead, to deplore Vietnamese inter-
vention against the offending regime. 66 Similarly, in 1971, the U.N.
called on India (albeit not by name) to withdraw its troops and ob-
serve a cease-fire after the Indian army had joined Bengali insurgents
to end Pakistan's bloody repression in the territory that became the
state of Bangladesh. 67 Yet both Vietnamese and Indian interventions
relieved what, in any nation's conception of justice, surely was recog-
nizable intuitively as horrendous injustice.
Regrettably, states seem reluctant to distinguish between interven-
tions that may be said to advance human rights - as in the cases of
Kampuchea or Bangladesh - and interventions, such as those of the
61. T. HOBBES, supra note 4, at 115.
62. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993 (entered into force
Oct. 24, 1945).
63. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
64. G.A. Res. 2625, id., provides that where a state deprives "peoples" of "their right to self-
determination and freedom and independence... such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter."
65. This is not surprising since "[t]he Assembly has never been able to bring itself to address
the extirpation of entire populations-some seven to nine million persons-in Burundi,
Kampuchea and Pakistani Bengal." See Franck, Of Gnats and Camels: Is There a Double Stan-
dard at the United Nations?, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 811, 825 (1984).
66. G.A. Res. 34/22, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
67. The resolution was addressed to both India and Pakistan, but since Pakistani troops were
not on Indian soil, it was obviously aimed at New Delhi. G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI), 26 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
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Soviets in Afghanistan 68 and the U.S. in Nicaragua,69 which - argua-
bly - do not. Yet that reluctance is understandable. Part of the rea-
son is the difficulty, in the absence of impartially assessed facts, of
distinguishing between the categories of just and unjust intervention.
This makes real-life application of a general principle of justice highly
imprudent, for smaller nations, in particular, fear that a rule permit-
ting just interventions would be a hunting-license for the powerful to
do whatever they wished. In the real world and in the hypothetical
original position agreement on a principle of just intervention would
encounter this practical obstacle. Nations would not agree on a gen-
eral principle unless it were applied in particular instances by a process
they recognized as legitimate.
Nevertheless, nations know very well that justice requires distinc-
tions to be made between circumstances in which intervention is con-
templated. They merely do not think it safe to say so, or to formulate
a public principle. Thus lip service continues to be paid to the invaria-
ble application of the nonintervention rule. However, the rule is ig-
nored in practice in at least some of the most egregious instances
where it would lend support to an unjust result. For example,
Tanzania was not criticized for the invasion of Uganda, which at last
toppled Idi Amin. India, while told to withdraw its troops, was not
actually condemned for invading East Pakistan (Bangladesh), nor was
Israel penalized, or even seriously reprimanded, for its invasion of
Uganda to liberate hostages from its hijacked aircraft. 70
Still, in the verbal behavior of most states, all interventions tend to
be lumped together. 71 Some nations' representatives at the U.N. pri-
vately expressed relief that the U.S. invasion of Grenada had rid that
nation of another homicidal military dictator, but publicly voted to
68. The Security Council, unable to reach a unanimous consensus among its permanent
members, called upon the General Assembly to conduct an emergency special session concerning
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. See S.C. Res. 462, 35 U.N. SCOR (Res. & Dec.) at 2, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/36 (1980). Thereafter, the General Assembly "strongly deplore[d] the ... armed
intervention in Afghanistan" and "[c]all[ed] for the immediate, unconditional, and total with-
drawal of the foreign troops." G.A. Res. ES-6/2, U.N. GAOR (6th Emer. Spec. Sess.) Supp.
(No. 1) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/ES-6/7 (1980).
69. The World Court ruled that the United States, "by training, arming, equipping, financing
and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua ... acted ... in breach of its obligation under
customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State." Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146 (Judgment
of June 27), reprinted in 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1023, 1089 (1986). The General Assembly
subsequently passed a resolution calling for "full and immediate compliance" with the judgment.
G.A. Res. 41/31, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 23, 24, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
70. The Security Council failed to act in response to Uganda's complaint. SCOR, Mtgs.
1939-1943, 9-14 July 1976.
71. Franck, supra note 65, at 811-19.
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deplore the rescue as a violation of the sacrosanct nonintervention
principle.72 What is going on, here? Why do the nations seem to pre-
fer a Hobbesian principle of nature to a Rawlsian one of justice? And
why, having expressed this odd preference, are they inclined to modify
their formal adherence to the Hobbesian world by practical considera-
tions of justice, thereby tempering their actual level of response to in-
stances of intervention? Why, in other words, do nations continue
schizophrenically both to adhere to the Hobbesian principle of nonin-
tervention while informally recognizing a principle of just interven-
tions in egregious cases?
The answer is that this is precisely what states' representatives
would do behind the veil of ignorance, negotiating a principle of jus-
tice in the original position, if they knew that there would be no legiti-
mate authority in the community of nations to implement the
principle on which they came to agree. In the absence of such a legiti-
mate implementing authority, the representatives of states would have
to settle for a total prohibition on intervention, knowing that whatever
exceptions might be agreed upon in principle could all too easily be
perverted in practice by unilateral, self-judging claims enforced by the
rich and powerful against the poor and weak. A total ban on interven-
tion would be perceived as less unjust than a principle that, in practice,
would permit anything.
This does not mean, however, that states in the original position
would not agree that, in a more perfect world community, justice
would require exceptions to the rule of nonintervention. They would
agree that these exceptions would not be asserted unilaterally but
would first have to be validated by a legitimate international forum:
whether a court, a probative fact-finding institution, or other multilat-
eral body acting in a disinterested manner.
If the negotiators, behind the veil of ignorance, could assume that
any principle on which they agreed would only be implemented if it
were found applicable in specific circumstances by a legitimate pro-
cess, then they would probably produce a general principle that did
not adopt Hobbesian cynicism as its surrogate for justice. We can im-
agine that, set free to think only of principles of justice, they would
aver that societies could become so unjust as to make external inter-
vention the just remedy. 73
72. Discussions conducted by Franck with U.N. ambassadors at pertinent times in 1983-84.
For a discussion of the Grenada intervention in the context of international law pertaining to
humanitarian intervention, see Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention in International Law, 32
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 357 (1985).
73. Regardless of a society's conception of justice, all parties would agree that certain social
arrangements - e.g., the practice of genocide - are indicative of an unjust society.
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One model of a general principle of justified intervention has been
proposed by Professor Mark Wicclair:
It is legitimate for one nation NI to temporarily intervene in the af-
fairs of another nation N2 provided: (1) The basic political, economic,
and/or social arrangements of N2 are grossly unjust. (2) The govern-
ment of N2 has consistently failed to take positive steps toward promot-
ing just arrangements, and in the absence of external intervention it is
unlikely that any timely and significant improvement will occur. (3) One
of Nl's goals is the promotion of more just arrangements in N2.
(4) There is a reasonable likelihood that Ni can successfully accomplish
the goal referred to in (3).74
This is less incompatible with Rawls's expressed thoughts than
might, at first, appear. It seems logical to us that in a world where
grave injustice is known to be the lot of people oppressed by their own
governments, parties in the original position would opt for some rule
permitting just intervention, as long as they could expect a legitimate
international body to decide whether the rule justifies any particular
intervention. 75 Rawls's prediction that states in the original position
would nominate nonintervention as a basic principle of justice was
based on a quite different assumption: that the negotiators in the orig-
inal position would not reach issues of international justice until after
agreeing on the principles of justice that must apply to their domestic
systems. In negotiating the domestic principles of justice, the first
principle Rawls believes the parties would choose is one which dictates
that all persons within every society be treated with the greatest equal
liberty, compatible with a like liberty for all. Therefore, mutual nonin-
terference (equal liberty or nonintervention) as guiding principle in re-
lations between nations would be appropriate in the postulated
circumstances of equal liberty within nations. Another way to put this
is that the principle of nonintervention would be recognized as just
only among states which have accepted, and applied domestically, the
basic principles of human rights.
The assumption that negotiation of principles of justice for the
world could only occur after each nation had agreed on principles of
justice applicable domestically allows us to reach the same result by a
different route. As Professor David Richards notes:
[C]ontractors are basically concerned that the institutional structure
of a nation itself satisfies the first principle of justice. And thus, where
there is a grave violation of equal liberty within institutions, the contrac-
74. Wicclair, Rawls and the Principle of Nonintervention, in JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF SO-
CIAL JUSTICE 300 (H. Blocker and E. Smith eds. 1980).
75. Wicclair warns that given the nature of international politics, the appointment of a mul-
tinational body could actually have the unwanted effect of diminishing the chances of interven-
tion ever being approved. Id. at 302.
[Vol. 10: 127
Justice in the International-System
tors will view war ... [as] a justified means in stopping this.... Impor-
tantly, the contractors are concerned not with the well-being of
institutions .. but with the well-being of persons; and thus, it is per-
fectly natural that the contractors may approve the destruction of a cer-
tain nation, if it severely frustrates the interests of its populace. 76
Of course, the parties would also realize that individual nations
could not be the judge, jury and executioner in deciding claims to in-
tervention. Richards maintains that "contractors would agree that
some form of supreme supra-national authority, having the final
power over the exercise of coercive power, should be created in order
to make wars morally unnecessary, and to ensure that coercion is
more justly executed in forcing obedience to moral principles. ' '77
Therefore, in examining the principle of nonintervention through
the lens of global justice, we must initially determine if the institutions
within a given society are just or likely to become so without external
interference. 78 If so, there can be no justification for intervention, cer-
tainly not of a military nature, but also not by "subversion, payoffs to
government officials, conditional bilateral aid, and similar techniques
of influence."' 79 However, if institutions are sometimes unjust and un-
likely to change internally, then intervention may be permissible
within specified limitations. These might be fourfold: first, that the
intervention be able to bring about the desired event - that is, the
promotion of just institutions; second, that it must not be for the ad-
vancement of any particular socio-economic system;80 and, third, that
the intervention must not prove too costly to the interveners nor to
other goals and objectives of the global community.8' An intervention
leading to a world nuclear war, for example, would be both foolish and
unjust since it would not achieve the liberation of an oppressed people
but, instead, cause widespread suffering to oppressors and oppressed
alike. Fourth, whether the preceding three conditions for just inter-
vention have been met in any particular instance would have to be
determinable by recourse to a legitimate decision-making process.
76. D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 137-38 (1971).
77. Id. at 138.
78. In our definition of a just society we recognize that there are various socioeconomic and
cultural differences among societies, and that principles of justice appropriate to many existing
social systems diverge from the principles propounded in western theories of justice.
79. C. BEITZ, supra note 53, at 92.
80. Richard Falk makes the argument that an international body properly constituted to
reflect diverse ideologies and cultures could decide when intervention is necessary for global
justice, and in this way provide assurance against self-serving unilateral intervention by states.
See R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 349-52 (1968).
81. For an analysis of each condition see C. BEITZ, supra note 53, at 90-92.
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IX. SELF-DETERMINATION
Imagine a sovereign state of Euphoria with a population consisting
of two different ethnic groups: the Sucrose and the Lactose peoples.
The former inhabit the northern region, the latter the south. Sucrose
people make up 60 percent and Lactose 40 percent of the population.
For generations, the Sucrose have dominated the Lactose. By virtue
of their numerical superiority, the Sucrose have dominated Euphoria's
elected parliament and used this majority to impose various restric-
tions on the Lactose minority. Lactose citizens are restricted to 20
percent of jobs in the public sector of the economy, 20 percent of the
land, and that in the inclement northern mountains of the country,
and 20 percent of places in the public schools and universities. Legis-
lation enacted ten years ago by the parliament has imposed a stiff poll
tax on Euphoria's voters which effectively disenfranchises most Lac-
tose citizens, who are poor. Sucrose has been made the sole official
language of the nation. The effect of all this has been to create a Lac-
tose secessionist movement, with a political wing which campaigns
peacefully for a Lactose homeland in the northern region, and an un-
derground army, which fights for the same objectives through a level
of violence approaching civil war.
The political and military struggle in Euphoria has been underway
for a decade, since the enactment of the poll tax. It has disrupted life
not only in Euphoria, but also in the three neighboring states, where
thousands of refugees - both Sucrose and Lactose - from Euphoria's
civil strife are now camped and causing severe economic, social and
political dislocation. The foreign ministers of these neighboring states
are meeting to do something about the Euphoria crisis.
Would Rawlsian principles of justice be relevant to such a confer-
ence? If considerations of justice are assumed to play a role in the
outcome of these states' deliberations, what would be its applicable
principles?
Once again, as noted in section 7, Rawls has addressed this prob-
lem briefly. Behind the veil of ignorance, he has suggested, rational
state representatives would agree upon a right of self-determination as
a general principle of justice. Let us examine whether, and how, the
principle might guide the neighboring countries' foreign ministers in
dealing with Euphoria.
As noted by Professor Beitz, the concept of self-determination can
be regarded as the "positive" aspect of state autonomy.8 2 While the
82. Id. at 92-93. See also A. CASSESE, supra note 59, at 131-37; L.C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION:
THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 44-137, 216-40 (1978).
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principle of nonintervention protects the rights of states already in-
dependent, self-determination protects the option to choose indepen-
dence of nations under foreign control. Nonintervention is
conservative, tending to preserve the international status quo. Self-
determination, however, is dynamic in that it may sanction change in
the structure of the international order. It is apparent that the two
principles, rather than invariably supporting one another, actually
may sometimes conflict.
The notion that national or ethnic groups are entitled to "self-de-
termination" began to be applied in the settlement of post-World
War I land claims. The United States delegation to the Versailles
Peace Conference was instructed to apply ethnic criteria in the resolu-
tion of all European territorial disputes. Towards that end, President
Woodrow Wilson saw to it that his negotiating team at Versailles in-
cluded historians, ethnologists, and geographers.8 3 Moreover, he in-
sisted that settlements be based on "racial aspects, historic
antecedents, and economic and commercial elements." 8
4
After World War II, the principle of self-determination was ex-
panded beyond the boundaries of Europe to include the movement
towards colonial independence. The U.N. Charter expressed a general
obligation of member states to bring inhabitants of non-self-governing
territories to the point at which they could make a meaningful choice
as to their destiny. By joining the U.N., parties accepted "a sacred
trust" to "develop self-government, to take due account of the political
aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive devel-
opment of their free political institutions .... ,,85 This led to dramatic
events. After the early post-war decolonizations of India, Burma and
Ghana, nearly one billion people gained rights to self-determination
within only 30 years (1947-1977). During that period, U.N. member-
ship nearly tripled as many more newly-independent nations joined
the organization.
However, while the European application of the principle of self-
determination in the 1920s encouraged the breakup of multi-ethnic na-
tions like Austro-Hungary and the rearrangement of boundaries as
various groups elected to shift allegiance, the principle operated differ-
ently in Africa and Asia in the period following World War II. In the
latter, self-determination was defined in almost every instance as a
right exercisable by the people of a colony - regardless of ethnicity -
83. 1 R.S. BAKER, WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT 109 (1923).
84. Id. at 187.
85. Charter of the United Nations, supra note 62, at art. 73.
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within its established territorial boundaries. These had been created
quite arbitrarily by the imperial powers and frequently embraced peo-
ples of disparate races, cultures and religions. Thus, self-determina-
tion, defined in this way, frustrated the ambitions of various tribes and
other groups. Nevertheless, most indigenous leaders of the third
world agreed to this limitation because they feared that self-determina-
tion would otherwise lead to a fragmentation which would result in a
proliferation of impoverished, highly vulnerable, tribal mini-states.8 6
Thus it was that the period of decolonization was also one of grow-
ing ambiguity about the principle from which it had gained its philo-
sophical impetus. Third world drafters of the U.N. Declaration on
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,87 in
proclaiming the principle that "[a]ll persons have the right to self-de-
termination"88 also added the caveat that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial in-
tegrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of
the United Nations."' 89 On this basis, Nigeria denied the ethnically
and religiously distinct Ibo tribe its right to self-government when it
sought statehood for Biafra. 90 Even earlier, India's armed forces had
thwarted the desire of the people of Kashmir for self-rule (or union
with Pakistan), despite the fact that the bulk of the populace was quite
alien to India ethnically, culturally and religiously.91
These denials of self-determination were condoned by the interna-
tional community, which has consistently refrained from criticizing
the use of force by new nations to crush secessionist movements, in
marked contrast to the intense criticism of the force sometimes used
by European powers to quell agitation for independence in their colo-
nies. Powerful African and Asian states, themselves only recently
freed from alien rule, felt free to send military aid to other govern-
ments dealing with disaffected minorities seeking independence. Most
remarkable is the recent spectacle of India providing troops to sup-
press the secessionist movement in Sri Lanka mounted by Tamils of
Indian origin. There are other such paradoxes. Nigeria sought and
received military assistance from its former colonial masters, the Brit-
ish, to extinguish the secessionist Ibo state of Biafra. Zimbabwe, hav-
86. For further discussion see Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694,
697-98 (1976).
87. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
88. Id. at art, 2.
89. Id. at art. 6.
90. Biafra had declared its independence on May 30, 1967.
91. India Independence Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 30.
[Vol. 10: 127
Justice in the International System
ing only recently gained control of the country from its white settlers92
vigorously used a largely white-led militia to suppress secessionism
among the Ndebele tribe in the western region. 93 As for the United
Nations, it actually dispatched a large multinational military effort led
by Irish and Swedish troops to prevent a populist tribal secession in
the Katanga province of newly independent Zaire.94
This seeming "checkerboard" 95 practice, comporting with the am-
bivalent text of the General Assembly's enunciation of applicable gen-
eral principles in the Declaration on Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, gives rise to the suspicion that the
U.N. Charter's frequent references 96 to the principle of self-determina-
tion merely camouflages an absence of any coherent principle.
Against this actual performance of states can be set Rawls's belief that
self-determination is a general principle of justice at which nations
would arrive in a negotiation behind the veil of ignorance. Is self-
determination a potentially meaningful concept of justice, one which
could help guide the foreign ministers addressing the problems of Eu-
phoria, or is it - as the post-decolonization practice may suggest -
an opportunistic shibboleth lacking any moral content?
As we have observed, Rawls postulates negotiations between repre-
sentatives of states who do not know which country they represent but
who do have some information about the realities of the world. Is
there a rational principle of justice at which such negotiators would
arrive? They would know that many states are multi-ethnic and that
92. Zimbabwe came into official existence at midnight on April 17, 1980, thus bringing to a
close the former white-ruled government of Rhodesia, which was first established by the United
Kingdom under the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. See 518 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 899-996 (1953).
93. After a new outbreak of killings by anti-government rebels in late 1982, the Zimbabwean
government deployed the army's Fifth Brigade in Matebeleland North in late January, 1983.
Amnesty International reported allegations of executions, torture and detention carried out by
the Brigade against the Ndebele in its effort to quash the dissidents. See AMNESTY INT'L, COUN-
TRY REPORTS: AFRICA 123 (1984). Yet, to Robert Mugabe's credit, his ruling ZANU party has
made peace with ZAPU, the opposition party led by the Ndebele leader, Joshua Nkomo. Their
alliance, hopefully, spells the end to ethnic division that has plagued Zimbabwe since indepen-
dence. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1987, sec. 1, at 3, col. 4. Indeed, a promising sign is seen in the
fact that with Mugabe's inauguration as Zimbabwe's first Executive President, Nkomo has also
been named Vice President and Second Secretary of Mugabe's party. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,
1988, sec. 1, at 3, col. 4.
94. For a discussion of U.N. action in Katanga see Franck and Carey, The Role of the United
Nations in the Congo - A Retrospective Perspective, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS ACTION IN THE CONGO 41-51 (L. Tondel ed. 1963). See also S.C. Res. 169, 16 U.N.
SCOR (Res. & Dec.) at 3, U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961).
95. Professor Ronald Dworkin first makes use of this term in the context of political compro-
mise. For him, "checkerboard" laws describe arbitrary distinctions drawn on matters of princi-
ple, leading only to incoherence and irrationality. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 178-84
(1986).
96. Charter of the United Nations, supra note 62, at arts. 1(2), 73, 76.
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some of these have secessionist movements. They would also know
that many states oppress or deprive groups, some of which seek eman-
cipation through secession. They would know that some secessionist
groups, although not manifestly oppressed, seek independence to pre-
serve their religious, racial or historic identity. Knowing all this, are
there any just general principles of self-determination on which ration-
ally self-interested representatives of states could agree in their origi-
nal position, ignorant of which state they represent?
Obviously, identifying such principles of self-determination-as-jus-
tice will be more difficult, given the complexities of the real world
which the just principle must address, than was the search for a just
principle of nonintervention. It is highly unlikely that the negotiators
would agree on the Wilsonian principle that every discrete ethnic
group is entitled to self-determination "on demand" and regardless of
circumstances. Even Wilson compromised the principle in such cases
as the Rhineland. 97 In its purest form, the principle has been champi-
oned by John Stuart Mill, who wrote: "Where the sentiment of na-
tionality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all
the members of the nationality under the same government, and a gov-
ernment to themselves apart."'98 In practice, however, few, if any, gen-
uine representatives of governments, even behind the veil of ignorance,
would subscribe to a principle of justice defined with so little regard
for the national security, economic well-being and stability of nations.
One way to overcome this dilemma, perhaps the one Rawls might
choose, is to reiterate that, in the international version of the original
position, parties would already have decided on the basic requirements
of a just national socio-political system, utilizing the considerations of
equality and liberty discussed in section 6, above. When they next
begin to negotiate general principles of justice applicable to the com-
munity of states they would be able to assume that they came from a
state which had agreed on the principles of justice applicable domesti-
cally. The notion of the equality of all citizens would be the first of
these agreed principles, whether or not it was actually being imple-
mented by any particular nation's system of government. A shared
97. The separation of the Saar basin or Rhineland from Germany posed a clear conflict with
the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, since its four million inhabitants were ethnic
Germans. However, the President submitted the geopolitical logic - the creation of a buffer
Rhenish Republic would help prevent a German resurgence. The compromise eventually
worked out by the powers at the Versailles Peace Conference led to the formation of a Saar
territory which was not to be independent but administered through the League of Nations. See
C. SEYMOUR, THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE 334-35, 345 (1928). See also 2
H.W.V. TEMPERLEY, A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS 182 (1924).
98. J.S. MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, in 19 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JOHN STUART MILL 547 (J. Robson ed. 1977).
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notion of equality-as-justice thus already would have shaped each na-
tion's view of what justice in the context of the international commu-
nity should say about the conditions in Euphoria and what the
neighboring states would be entitled to do, in the name of justice,
when those conditions were not met.99 The answer is that states in the
original position would agree that justice entitles minorities which per-
sistently are denied equal rights to separate from the oppressing state
and form their own nation, and entitles neighboring states to help
them achieve it where that is the only, or the fastest, least costly and
painful way to realize their right. On the other hand, minorities"°° not
subject to persistent discriminatory treatment would have no such jus-
tice claim to self-determination, let alone to external help in pursuing a
secessionist agenda.
The principle of justice endorsed by the nations would not likely be
that championed by J.S. Mill or Woodrow Wilson. "No fault" self-
determination "on demand" based solely on distinct racial, cultural or
religious characteristics would be resisted by rational negotiators in
the original position because they represent states. They would reflect
states' resilient determination to survive internal or external efforts at
dismemberment. They would also know or believe that secession
might lead to great economic injustices being inflicted upon the re-
maining (non-seceded) population if territorial realignment gave sepa-
ratists most of a state's natural resources.101 Consequently, a group's
secession claim would require a justification powerful enough to over-
come a rationally-deduced presumption that existing state configura-
tions should not be disturbed. Moreover, any justification which
states' representatives would agree to be sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption in favor of unity, would have to be of an order which posed
no threat to the sort of state the negotiators could logically believe
themselves to be representing. A rule validating only claims based on
grossly unequal treatment meets these tests. Self-determination for
99. The situation does not have to be limited to former colonies. There can be secessionist
movements even within the ex-imperial powers - for example, the Basque separatists in Spain
and the I.R.A. in England. We couch the conflict in a colonial context because it shows most
vividly competing interests of territorial integrity and post-independence solidarity versus the
desire of groups with similar cultural and spiritual values to form their own society.
100. For a judicial interpretation of what constitutes a "community" for purposes of crossing
the threshold to the question of entitlement to self-determination, some guidance is afforded by
the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Greco-Bulgarian "Communi-
ties" case, where it was defined as "a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having
a race, religion, language and traditions of their own, and united by the identity of such race,
religion, language and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity .. " 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17,
at 33.
101. This would have happened if the oil-rich Ibos seceded from Nigeria; people of the
princely-state of Kashmir left India; or mineral-laden Katanga separated from Zaire.
Winter 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
religious or tribal groups would not be endorsed by a principle of jus-
tice unless such group actually and egregiously were denied equal ac-
cess to rights and benefits. Equal access, in this context, would mean
entitlements not necessarily equal in result but only as nearly equal as
is compatible with the efficient organization of the society for order
and economic development.
Even if these stiff criteria for rebutting the presumption favoring
national unity were met, however, the rationally-agreed principle
would be unlikely to sanction self-determination until it is clear that
the injustice is not likely to be remedied by the existing processes of
the unjust state. A group alleging injustice would not be entitled to
invoke self-determination - let alone have it enforced by the interven-
tion of other states - until it became apparent that the denials of
equality and liberty have become so hopelessly impacted that the un-
just system is incapable of remedying itself. ' 02
As with the principle of nonintervention, there is likely to be much
hesitation by states' representatives behind the veil of ignorance when
faced with the choice whether to endorse a general principle of justice
which would validate a decision by the foreign ministers of neighbor-
ing states to employ military force to redress the injustices visited on
the Lactose people by the Sucrose majority in Euphoria. This hesita-
tion would not stem from ambiguity about a suitably circumscribed
substantive principle of the kind we have been discussing which would
endorse the justice of collective redress of inj.ustice. Rather, the
doubts would arise because of the lack of legitimate procedures for
ensuring that the decision to use force is not made in inappropriate
circumstances, as a cover for self-serving intervention by strong na-
tions to achieve dominance over the weak. 103 Only when that hesita-
102. Such was the case in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), where the Supreme Court
ruled that federal courts could and must decide constitutional challenges to state representation
at the suit of qualified voters who claimed impairment of their right to franchise. In Baker,
Blacks in Tennessee complained that the state's Apportionment Act denied them representation
in state government. Although the Court ordinarily would have been loath to meddle in a state's
political process, Justice Brennan opined that here there was no choice. The appellants had
demonstrated that "because of the composition of the legislature effected by the 1901 Apportion-
ment Act, redress in the form of a state constitutional amendment to change the entire mecha-
nism for reapportioning, or any other change short of that, [was] difficult or impossible." Id. at
193.
103. As one of the authors has observed, "[a] study of interventions in practice ... reveals
that most have occurred in situations where the humanitarian motive is at least balanced, if not
outweighed, by a desire to protect alien property or to reenforce socio-political and economic
instruments of the status quo." Franck & Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 278-79 (1973). Indeed, the humanitarian
grounds advanced as justification for the Soviet Union's interventions in Hungary and Czecho-
slovakia, as well as those of the United States in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, were
largely bogus. Id. at 285-87.
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tion can be allayed by a legitimate process of validation and
implementation would states' representatives in the original position
be likely to endorse a principle of self-determination enforceable by
other states in cases where liberty and equality were denied to a dis-
tinct group by those with power within a state.
Indeed, the international community has already expressed itself
unambiguously in support of such firm but flexible principles through
a Declaration on Human Rights and two Human Rights Cove-
nants, t°4 as well as enumerations of principles against racism 0 5 and
religious intolerance.t0 6 Even states which clearly have failed to eradi-
cate all of these wrongs have adhered to such obligations in princi-
ple 0 7 and the community of states, in its political and social organs,
has voted to investigate or censure at least some ostensible violators.' 0 8
Consistently, however, the human rights standard expected of states is
to move in the right direction, not to arrive at instant perfection.
In this way, the mandates of self-determination and noninterven-
tion are reconciled in principle. Only where it has been credibly deter-
mined by a legitimate process of decision that egregious denials of
equal treatment and basic liberties have become irremediably im-
pacted in the governance of a state may the international community
104. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 220(XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966). The texts of these documents are conveniently located in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (R. Lillich ed. 1983).
105. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). Reprinted in 5 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 352 (1966).
106. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/
36/684 (1981). Reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 205 (1982).
107. For example, the Soviet Union ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on
October 16, 1973 and the United Kingdom did the same on May 20, 1976. See Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as of 31 December 1987, U.N. Doc. ST/
LEG/SER.E/6, at 128 (1988). While both nations are persistent advocates of the principles
enunciated in the Covenant, they continue to ill-treat parts of their population - Soviet Jews and
Northern Irish, respectively.
108. The U.N. Economic and Social Council, through its Human Rights Commission, has
empowered numerous Special Rapporteurs to investigate charges of human rights violations in
countries and to report their findings. For example, the Commission last year requested a Special
Representative "to present an interim report to the General Assembly... on the human rights
situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran" and extended his mandate to investigate for another
year. E.S.C. Res. 1987/55, 43 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 121, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/60
(1987). After hearing the Representative's report, the Assembly voted to express "deep concern"
over the allegations of human rights abuses in Iran and urged that government to respect and
abide by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. G.A. Res. 42/136, Press Release G.A./
7612, at 436 (1987).
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take collective steps to enforce the justice claims of a minority (or ma-
jority) to self-determination.
X. EQUALITY AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
It is intuitively apparent that the greatest injustices in the interna-
tional system are to be found in the global economy. The great and
growing disparities between rich and poor are the major scandal of
humanity at the end of the twentieth century. Does Rawlsian justice
provide a framework within which this problem can be addressed?
The international system is based on a notion of state equality.
The U.N. Charter, in article 2, states that the organization is "based
on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members." If nations'
representatives were to meet in the original position behind the veil of
ignorance, it seems most likely that they would agree very quickly that
state equality is a fundamental norm of any Rawlsian system of justice
in the international community.
At the same time it is clear that states are not equal in practice,
especially in the economic field. What are the practical implications of
a Rawlsian notion of equality as it applies to the redistribution of
global resources?
The scope of the problem is readily identified, but the causes and
cures are more elusive. Students and theorists of national social and
economic underdevelopment argue that a colonial people's right to
self-determination is not fully realized with liberation if they are still
dependent upon their former colonizers and other industrialized na-
tions for economic survival. 10 9 They see some third world nations as
barred indefinitely from developing economic infrastructures because
they fail to emerge from a self-perpetuating neocolonial stage at which
they serve only as sources of raw materials and cheap labor. " 0 More-
over, because of disparities in natural resource endowments, capital
accumulation and technological advancements between developed and
developing states, "free" trade may be perceived as causing or perpetu-
ating relative, if not absolute, declines in the well-being of the least
109. See, e.g., CARDOSO & FALE'rO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA (M. Urquidi trans. 1979); A. FRANK, DEPENDENT ACCUMULATION AND UN-
DERDEVELOPMENT (1979); and I. WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD ECONOMY: ESSAYS
(1979).
110. It is worth noting that Frantz Fanon believed that neocolonialism, by impeding the
growth of domestic institutions, helped to foster those religious and ethnic conflicts that led to
secessionist movements. See his excellent discussion of this phenomenon in F. FANON, THE
WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 148-205 (1963).
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advantaged.I' I
On the other side, believers in efficient market theory are of the
view that past colonialism and imperialism are not to blame for wide-
spread economic failure in the third world. They argue that develop-
ing countries insist on producing commodities for which there is little
demand, and that foreign aid too often subsidizes such folly. For
them, only development of market-oriented policies will induce long-
term economic growth for these nations. They cite the Republic of
China (Taiwan), Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore as examples
of economic development through market-led initiatives.
' 2
As the above views suggest, there are great differences of opinion
regarding the root causes of inequalities between rich and poor nations
in their share of global wealth and resources. Suppose the Ministers of
Economic Affairs of each nation in the world were to gather at a con-
ference to consider various schemes for global redistribution of re-
sources; that is, a mandatory scheme to reduce extreme disparities
between rich and poor. Would Rawlsian principles of justice have
anything relevant to say about the forms and substance such a scheme
might take? Rawls's theory of justice does not address this question
directly. "Moderate scarcity" may not do justice to the global situa-
tion. Rawls, as we have seen, focuses on self-sufficient national socie-
ties and not on the far more complex interdependent system of
autonomous states and economies." 3 It is nevertheless instructive to
imagine the world as a self-contained entity, made up of countries that
are economically and fiscally interdependent, and to imagine parties in
the international original position negotiating principles of economic
justice applicable to this community of states.' 14
Behind the veil of ignorance, the parties would not know which
nation they were, but would know that states vary unconscionably in
their economic development, both the real per capita income of their
populations and the life prospects and expectations of their popula-
tions. Yet, behind the veil of ignorance, the parties would not know
whether they represented a developed or developing nation, and thus
would want to search for principles as fair as possible to all.
At first, we might conjecture that parties would simply agree to a
111. In support of the position that trade absolutely impoverishes developing nations see M.
BROWN, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERIALISM 96-126 (1974).
112. See, e.g., Bandow, The U.S. Role in Promoting Third World Development, in U.S. AID
TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD: A FREE MARKET AGENDA vii (1985).
113. See J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 8, 457.
114. David Richards provides an excellent discussion of the parties' decision-making process
for principles of international distributive justice. See D. RICHARDS, supra note 76, at 138-41.
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principle requiring equal distribution of wealth between rich and poor,
with appropriate transfers of income and resources from the former to
the latter. On further consideration, however, it might seem more
likely that the parties would realize that immediate equality of wealth
by such transfers would have an adverse impact on the global econ-
omy, by decreasing productive efficiency, investment, research and
technological advancement. This would precipitate a long-run decline
in the standard of living or, at least, the rate of economic growth, for
all countries. As Richards notes: "While such transfers from rich to
poor nations might raise the life prospects of desire satisfaction of all
the present standard classes of underdeveloped countries, . . .it also
involves lowering the life prospects of desire satisfaction of future gen-
erations in [those] standard classes."1 15
Consequently, parties might reject absolute statistical equality
through redistributive transfers. In doing so, they would be adopting
the global analog of Rawls's second principle of justice, which he has
designated the "difference principle." This holds that although justice
is usually best served by an equal distribution of resources, this would
not be so if the result were to reduce the resources available to all. In
that case an unequal distribution is permissible so long as the re-
sources available to the least advantaged is thereby increased signifi-
cantly. 16 For example, let us suppose that X represents the most
advantaged nation and Y is the least advantaged. No matter how
much a proposed course of action would improve X's situation, justice
would not be served unless: 1) Y also benefitted and 2) the gap be-
tween X and Y decreased. Thus Rawls's notion is not tantamount to
acceptance of the free-market principle because it would reject a policy
which led to absolute growth of the world economy at the cost of a
greater comparative disparity between the rich and the poor. Even a
program which would increase the quantity of goods or benefits avail-
able to X and Y would be unjust if it did not create a greater propor-
tion of benefit for Y and thereby decrease the relative degree of
inequality." 7 In addition, an unjust distribution may also be said to
exist when inequality is excessive. Excessiveness in this sense, means
any hypothetical situation in which a theoretical decrease in X's share
would bring about an equal or greater increase in Y's share. Put an-
115. Id. at 139.
116. For schematic diagrams of the difference principle's operation in domestic distributive
justice see J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 75-80.
117. The difference principle is more egalitarian than a utilitarian calculus whose aim is to
maximize the aggregate level of global wealth. Utilitarianism dictates a greater portion to X if
doing so increases the aggregate beyond that reached by the difference principle, even though this
would make Y worse off and/or promote larger inequalities. Id. at 77-78.
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other way, justification for any policy which yields unequal distribu-
tion of benefits would require - to meet the expectation of justice -
that the poorer states would also benefit and that they would suffer no
comparative loss in their entitlement to benefits.
The trouble with these notions of global resource reallocation is
that we have been using the state as the basic integer, rather than the
individual. This condition, in the name of distributive justice, has a
tendency to magnify distributive injustice, because it promotes re-
source transfers from poor people in rich countries to rich people in
poor countries. Rawlsian justice would not ratify such a result. Since
the Rawlsian analysis supposes that a negotiation among representa-
tives of states to arrive at principles of international justice could only
occur after agreement on principles of justice has been reached by ne-
gotiations among the people within each national society, it follows
that the parties to the international negotiation would press for global
principles which would be compatible with the principles of justice -
equality and liberty - which have already been adopted domestically.
If that precondition is met, the representatives of the negotiating
states, behind the veil of ignorance, would have to include domestic
distributional principles in any agreed definition of international dis-
tributive justice. In other words, the international principles of dis-
tributive justice would necessarily have to narrow, not widen, the gap
between rich and poor within each state as well as between states.
Thus one might expect the parties to agree that the first claim of
justice was to raise the living standards not of the poorest nations -
which can be done by further enriching the elites within those states
- but of the poorest populations within every nation. Put another
way, the requisites of distributive justice might be defined in terms of
minimal entitlements to food, shelter, clothing and education and a
just system of redistribution would aim to achieve that minimum level
within each state. This would ensure that very rich third world na-
tions, as well as developed first and second world states, would con-
tribute to the redistribution. Moreover, very rich classes within third
world nations might be expected to contribute to poor classes in other
(including developed) states.
The first principle of international economic justice to which
states, representatives rationally might agree, negotiating behind the
veil of ignorance in the original position, is that resources should be
directed from populations with greatest surplus to populations with
greatest deficit. The simplest, although not necessarily the most effica-
cious way to implement such a principle would be by a global income
tax based on per capita income. Thus it might be agreed that nations
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whose per capita income (PCI) was in excess of $X would contribute
1% of their gross national product (GNP) to a resource reallocation
fund; those with PCI above $Y would contribute 2% of GNP and
those with PCI above $Z would contribute 3% of GNP. The means
by which these contributions would be raised by the nations with re-
source surplus could be left to implementation in accordance with the
principles of justice operating within each state. Payments out of the
resource allocation fund might be made in accordance with an inverse
version of the same formula, which would guarantee payments to each
state for programs directed to those in its population most egregiously
in resource deficit, total payments varying with the proportion of those
entitled to the recipient state's total population.
Such a tax formula would not solve global problems of economic
inequality. It is cited here merely as an example of a principle of real-
location that meets the test of a Rawlsian principle of justice. This can
be contrasted to other global tax proposals which would fail any such
rational test. For example, the commonly advanced notion that all
countries should contribute a fixed percentage of their GNP l l8 fails
because it focuses on the hypothetical capacity of states to pay, rather
than the resource surpluses and deficits of persons as reflected by each
nation's PCI. Thus justice ordains that Luxembourg, with a PCI of
$13,380, and Kuwait, with a PCI of $14,270, pay far more than China,
with a GNP 64 times that of Luxembourg and 13 times that of Ku-
wait. 19 Rawlsian principles of justice require that redistribution be
achieved by transfers from individuals in surplus to those in deficit,
rather than merely from high to low GNP economies. This would
ensure that the international principle reinforces, rather than operates
at cross-purposes to, the applicable domestic principle of distributive
justice. It also ensures that all states would derive some benefit for
their poorest classes, a result likely to be efficacious in promoting ac-
ceptance of the principle by states which could expect to be large con-
tributors to the redistributive resource pool.
As the above analysis of global distributive justice reveals, eco-
nomic aid from developed countries should not be viewed as a form of
international charity, but as an obligation stemming from social duty
118. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) first proposed
that developed countries give annually 1% of their GNP to developing nations. See Proceedings
of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at 38-39, U.N. Doc. TD/97, Vol. I,
U.N. Sales No. E.68.II.D. 14 (1968). This is still the predominant view, with an initial target of
0.7% of GNP as official development assistance, followed by a target of 1% to be reached as
soon as possible thereafter. See Proceedings of United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment at 20, U.N. Doc. TD/326 (Vol. I), U.N. Sales No. E.83.II.D.6 (1984).
119. These figures are based upon 1985 data from the World Bank. See Int'l Bank for Re-
construction and Development, WORLD BANK ATLAS (1987).
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owed by members of a community to one another. Moreover, in a
justice-based system of reallocation, contributions of foreign aid are
not morally discretionary. Beitz argues that aid "should not be re-
garded as a voluntary contribution ...but rather as a transfer of
wealth required to redress distributive injustice."' 20
The obligation of rich members of the community of states to aid
the poor is the basis for the United Nations General Assembly's adop-
tion of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order ("NIEO").' 2' NIEO seeks redistribution of global
resources by "devoting particular attention to the adoption of special
measures in favor of the least-developed ... countries."' 122 It espouses,
among other things, "[i]mproving the competitiveness of natural
materials facing competition from synthetic substitutes,"' 23 granting
"[p]referential and nonreciprocal treatment,"' 24 and providing
"favorable conditions for the transfer of financial resources" to devel-
oping countries. 25 Unfortunately, the appeal of this program to de-
veloped first- and second-world states is slight. In part this is due to
its weak justice claim, weakened by the NIEO's failure to address the
needs of poor people in all countries, as opposed to the needs only of
poor countries. The poor people of poor countries therefore have not
been able to make common cause with poor people in richer countries
because the NIEO places them in a hypothetically adversary, rather
than allied, position. This illustrates an important lesson. Rawlsian
justice must not be seen solely as a philosophical construct, but also as
an important strategic tool of statecraft to rally support for major
political projects.
Once again, it is apparent on examination that the willingness of
state negotiators to agree on principles of resource equalization is
likely to depend on agreement to institute a clear, rational redistribu-
tive formula and a credible instrumentality to apply the formula fairly,
case-by-case, in disputes that are likely to arise. For example, parties
120. For example, aid should be directed towards those who are the worst-off in any develop-
ing country, but this does not mean that an inability to do so is a reason for not giving aid.
Moreover, in countries where extreme poverty is a result of domestic income inequalities, then
pressure should be asserted for social reforms within that society. See id. at 172-73.
121. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201, 6th Spec. Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) [hereinafter
NIEO].
122. Id. at art. 4(c).
123. Id. at art. 4(m).
124. Id. at art. 4(n).
125. Id. at art. 4(o).
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to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 126 have agreed to a
rule - the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle - which theoreti-
cally banishes preferential treatment 27 while also accepting a Genera-
lized System of Preferences 128 for the least developed 129 which is
unavailable to the more prosperous members. 130 This complex double
helix of an operational principle has been acceptable in part because of
its manifest justice, ' 3' reinforced by a carefully-drafted rule and the
existence of a credible mechanism for resolving disputes over its
interpretation. 132
XI. JUSTICE AND ITS RELATION TO LEGITIMACY
Justice and legitimacy are concepts which are related, often con-
fused, but significantly different. It is useful to an understanding of
either to examine it in its relationship to the other.
Legitimacy is the quality of a rule or principle which conduces to
the perception, on the part of those to whom it is directed, that it
ought to be obeyed because of the rightness of the way, and the form,
in which the rule has evolved or been enacted. Max Weber has defined
the legitimacy of a rule primarily in terms of legislative, executive and
judicial process, 133 whereas Jurgen Habermas has focused on discur-
sively validated and informed social consent. 34 Marxists tend to de-
fine legitimacy in terms of outcomes, which bear a close affinity to
126. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. (5) and (6),
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S., 4 Bevans 639.
127. MFN provides that "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any con-
tracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories
of all other contracting parties." Id. at art. 1(1).
128. Differential More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Devel-
oping Countries, GATT Contracting Parties Decision of Nov. 28, 1979, GATT BISD 26th Supp.
203 (1980). Reprinted in J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1149 (2d ed. 1986).
129. Id. at para. 6.
130. Id. at para. 1.
131. The effect of GATT has been to improve trade mainly among developed states. The
purpose of GSP is to aid the less developed. As stated earlier, an increase in the share allocated
to the most advantaged nations is only commensurate with justice if the effect is to make the least
advantaged state proportionally better off.
132. An example of this is the GATT process invoked when negotiations failed to resolve
U.S. complaints against Japan regarding access to the latter's market for beef and citrus pro-
duced by the former. The parties agreed to let a GATT panel adjudicate the dispute. See N.Y.
Times, May 5, 1988, sec. D, at 1.
133. Weber postulates the validity of a rule in terms of its being regarded by the obeying
public "as in some way obligatory or exemplary" because it defines "a model" that is "binding"
and to which the actions of other "will in fact conform .. " See M. WEBER, I ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 31 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).
134. Habermas believed that "[w]hat are accepted as reasons and have the power to produce
consensus . . . depends on the level of justification required in a given situation." See J.
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perceptions of justice, but some neo-Marxists have urged the replace-
ment of the concept of legitimacy with the more empirical notion of
"rational grounds for action."1 35
In our discussion of Rawlsian justice, we have also noted an affin-
ity between legitimacy and justice, yet not one based on similarity be-
tween the two notions. In our Weberian view of legitimacy, its
relationship to justice is less conceptual than structural, that is, the
legitimacy of a rule or principle does not necessarily ensure its justice,
and, conversely, the justice of a rule need not correlate with its degree
of legitimacy. However, principles of justice are very difficult to define
without recourse to a supporting institutional structure to implement
the agreed principle. The degree to which such a structure is per-
ceived to be legitimate, and employs what are recognized as legitimate
procedures to implement the agreed principle of justice, will deter-
mine, at least in part, whether a principle can be negotiated in the
original position and what its content will be. Clearly, a rule enacted
in accordance with established procedures, and in compliance with the
rules about rules (such as the U.S. Constitution), might well be legiti-
mate, yet also unjust in the Rawlsian sense. Much U.S. law exempli-
fies both legitimacy and injustice. Yet legitimacy and justice are also
symbiotic, in the sense that principles of justice need infra-structural
support from principles of legitimacy.
In our efforts to find and apply Rawlsian general principles of jus-
tice in three specific international contexts - the principles of nonin-
tervention, self-determination and equality - it has become apparent
that states' representatives negotiating in the Rawlsian original posi-
tion behind the veil of ignorance would be more likely to agree on an
applicable principle of justice if they knew that the principle would be
implemented case-by-case through a. legitimate process, rather than
through self-serving interpretation by partisans. The legitimacy factor
thus is an important infrastructural prerequisite to agreement on gen-
eral principles of justice.
This means that the ability of parties in the original position to
arrive at general principles of justice depends upon their being assured
that the principles will be applied in a fashion, and by a process with
characteristics that would induce all the negotiators - not knowing
who they represent in the real world of states - to place their confi-
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dence in the principle and in the institutional process by which it is
implemented.
Whether such a legitimate process is available might well deter-
mine whether a general principle of justice can be negotiated and also
its content. To put it less abstractly, the extent to which justice claims
can be formulated and implemented in the international community
will be determined to a significant degree by perceptions of the princi-
ple's legitimacy and the legitimacy of the process by which it is
implemented.
XII. CONCLUSION
The concept of justice has conceptual and strategic value. Govern-
ments are not indifferent to justice claims: not only because they can-
not afford, as a matter of public relations, to be seen to be so, but also
because justice claims, made credibly, strengthen political claims with
which they coincide.
Justice claims can be made by anyone. To be credible, however,
the claim must be based on a principle to which other members of the
community would subscribe in the abstract. The Rawlsian theory of
justice helps us to identify such principles. In the international com-
munity, which Rawls addresses only briefly, the theory is only applica-
ble if two additional conditions apply. First, those negotiating the
content of general principles of global justice in the original position
behind the veil of ignorance must be assumed to represent states whose
peoples have already agreed on the principles of justice applicable to
each of their societies. This does not mean that aberrational depar-
tures from the implementation of those principles cannot occur (as in
Malarkey), but. it signifies that the negotiators would only agree to
international principles which enhance, or, at least, do not encumber
their domestic principles of justice. Second, it must be assumed that
the negotiators have agreed upon (or accept ex hypothesi) that the
principles upon which they agree will be implemented in practice sub-
ject to their interpretation by a process - judicial, arbitral or other -
which is perceived to be legitimate as to its mandate, its composition
and its modus operandi. With these caveats, the Rawlsian theory is
eminently applicable to the identification of the principles of justice in
a community of nations.
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